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∗corresponding author1. Introduction
In the literature on ﬁscal federalism, a variety of theoretical reasons for the decentalisa-
tion (or symmetrically: against the centralisation) of economic policies is oﬀered. The
literature concerned with the costs and beneﬁts of decentalised public good provision
in the tradition of Oates (1972) has identiﬁed regional diﬀerences in preferences as
an important rationale for decentralisation. The crucial insight is that a centralised
provision of a uniform supply of public goods for a population with heterogeneous
preferences across regions is associated with costs for those whose preferences are not
taken into account. Preference heterogeneity has also been an important feature of a
number of subsequent theoretical approaches. For example, Alesina and Spolaore (1997),
in a theory of the optimal size of nations, introduce the fundamental tradeoﬀ between
economies of scale in the consumption of public goods and the costs that arise due to
heterogeneous preferences.
The problem becomes more complicated in the face of regional public goods with spatial
externalities. If individuals in jurisdiction A gain a utility from a public good provided
in B and free-ride on the policies of B, underprovision of the public good is a standard
result. Welfare may then principally be improved through a number of diﬀerent channels:
If a central authority is politically or technologically restricted to setting a uniform level
of public goods in A and B, then a tradeoﬀ between the welfare gains from internalising
spillovers and the welfare losses due to a deviation from regional preferences has to be
analysed. Centralisation may or may not provide a Pareto improvement depending on
which eﬀect is dominant (Alesina et al. 2005).
1This tradeoﬀ disappears, however, if the central authority can set regionally diﬀerent
levels of public goods. Prima facie, centralisation that internalises spillovers ought to
be generally Pareto improving under this condition. However, additional caveats have
been introduced in models that also take political economy arguments into consideration,
such as Besley and Coate (2003) who show that individuals exploit cost-sharing rules
in a centralised regime. Being able to externalise a portion of the costs to taxpayers
from other jurisdictions, they startegically delegate public goods lovers to the central
level. This results in an overall overprovision of public goods. In a technically similar
model, Dur and Roelfsema (2005) show that not only over-, but also underprovision
may occur under a centralised regime if the public goods provided have a regional cost
component that cannot be shared through the central budget. In other models concerned
with budgetary eﬀects of (de-)centralisation, Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that
centralised regimes are more vulnerable to lobbying and therefore associated with larger
budgets, while Mazza and van Winden (2002) show that when a two-tier government with
central and regional authorities is modeled, smaller budgets may result compared to a
purely decentralised system. Their model is designed to closely reﬂect the institutions of
the European Union: One authority comprised of delegates from the regions (the Council)
decides on the overall size of the budget, while a central authority (the Commission)
decides on its apportionment. The ﬁxed size of the overall budget reduces the incentives
of special interest groups to lobby for speciﬁc spending measures, possibly even so far
that a smaller budget results in the centralised regime.
2While the contributions sketched above focus on the eﬀects of (de-)centralisation once it
has occured, a diﬀerent question concerns the process of institutional change itself: Un-
der which conditions can we expect centralisation of government to take place at all?
Ellingsen (1998) presents a model where the decision to centralise in the face of spillovers
hinges on the size and heterogeneity of regions and shows that diﬀerent combinations of
the relative size of regions and inter- as well as intra-regional heterogeneity are associated
with very diﬀerent probabilities of centralisation. In contrast, a model by Redoano and
Scharf (2004) focuses on a comparison of the centralisation decisions under direct and
representative democracy. They show that under the latter, a pro-centralization jurisdic-
tion can commit to a reluctant jurisdiction by sending a delegate with preferences close
to that of the majority in the reluctant jurisdiction. Therefore, centralisation is more
likely to occur under representative democracy in their model.
Regarding the question posed, the model presented here is most closely related to that
by Redoano and Scharf (2004): Is centralisation more likely to occur under direct or
under purely representative democracy? There are, however, important diﬀerences in
the approach to the problem. While the model by Redoano and Scharf understands
centralisation as harmonisation, our model allows a centralised regime to set diﬀerent
levels of public good supply over diﬀerent regions. And while Redoano and Scharf focus
on problems of commitment that occur in the process of centralisation, we allow for
rent extraction as a general problem of political delegation to appear in the model.
Nevertheless, it will be shown that even under these very diﬀerent assumptions, the
theoretical result presented by Redoano and Scharf is robust: centralisation is more
likely to occur under representative compared to direct democracy. Moreover, direct
3democracy is used by voters as an instrument to veto collusive centralisation that beneﬁts
representatives.
The argument will proceed as follows: In Section 2, we lay out the relevance of the issue
discussed here and locate it into the broader context of the related literature. Section 3
introduces the model and its core assumptions. In Section 4, we derive the ideal policies
for the median voter and for the representative under diﬀerent political institutions, and
in Section 5, we show that direct democracy eﬀectively works to impede centralisation
and can be seen as a federalism-preserving institution, regardless whether the centralised
regime works with a cooperative or a non-cooperative rule for decision-making. Finally,
Section 6 draws some conlcusions.
2. Centralisation and institutions: Why is it an issue?
In the model by Redoano and Scharf, the diﬀerence between representative and direct
democracy is made by the instrument of strategic delegation which is only available under
the former, but not under the latter type of instituions for collective decision-making.
Successful strategic delegation requires that the true preferences of candidates for oﬃce
are common knowledge. Only then can it be safely assumed that candidates can credibly
commit to implementing the policy (and only the policy) that is in accordance with their
own preferences. This approach therefore follows the pioneering contributions of Besley
and Coate (1997) as well as Osborne and Slivinski (1996), who ultimately exclude political
control problems from their analysis. In this class of cititzen-candidate models, voters
know in advance exactly what to expect from the candidates that stand for election.
4Laying emphasis on the possibility of strategic delegation therefore implies that an im-
portant rationale for having ﬁscal federalism, namely the control of self-interested repre-
sentatives between elections, is excluded from the theoretical considerations by assump-
tion. At the other end of the theoretical continuum, the literature on market-preserving
federalism (Weingast, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997) stresses the importance of feder-
alism in that respect. From this perspective, political decentralisation raises the single
government’s costs of encroaching its citizens’ property rights. Decentralisation limits
the scope of viable political interventions into individual rights and liberties, and thus
ultimately also works to preserve the functioning of the market process. A somewhat
related argument had already been made by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), who argued
that the competitive pressure between decentralised governments serves to inhibit ﬁscal
exploitation of the citizens.
In our model, we return to this original ideas of political economics and reckon that there
is uncertainty about the true preferences and motives of candidates for political oﬃce,
so that political control between elections is a problem that cannot be solved by perfect
delegation. Experience appears to suggest that, ultimately, we know relatively little
about which political measures a candidate indeed honestly prefers, and which he would
implement if he had suﬃcient constitutional and post-constitutional leeway. As citizens
listening to political speeches, we have little means to reliably distinguish between cheap
talk or opportunistic schmooze on the one hand, and an honest revelation of personal
preferences on the other. Acknowledging this, we introduce into our model uncertainty
regarding the candidates’ actual preferences, and therefore analyse the centralisation of
5public good provision in the light of a control problem that citizens have with regard to
their representatives.
The argument that such issues are relevant in decisions regarding the vertical allocation of
competencies has already been brought up in some strands of the literature. For example,
Blankart (2000) has argued in a case study comparison of Germany and Switzerland that
government centralisation in Germany has followed from the building of an expenditure
cartel by representatives of the sub-national L¨ ander. In Switzerland, on the other hand,
direct legislation is argued to have frustrated such attempts. However, Blankart did not
support this reasoning with a theoretical model. In a diﬀerent theoretical approach, de
Figueiredo and Weingast (2005) explore the concept of self-enforcing federalism. Their
focus is on balancing the competencies between local governments and the center such
that on the one hand, the central government is suﬃciently strong to enforce contributions
to federation-wide public goods provision, and on the other hand the local governments
can coordinate on policing encroachments by the central government.
In our present paper, we show in a formal model that the mere existence of rent extrac-
tion by representatives suﬃces to make citizens relatively reluctant to centralise politi-
cal competencies. If they have direct-democratic control mechanisms, then a centraliza-
tion of competencies occurs less often compared to an institutional framework in which
centralisation decisions are made by consenting representatives. In this sense, our pa-
per hints at the fact that making decisions to centralise contingent on the consent of a
majority of voters in an obligatory referendum should also be considered as a part of a
constitution that is designed to self-enforce a federal structure of government.
6Some econometric evidence already exists which hints at the fact that direct-democratic
instruments are used by citizens in order to decentralise ﬁscal competencies or to prevent
centralisation. For example, Matsusaka (2004) shows for the United States that the
popular initiative has been used to shift public spending from the state to the local level.
These eﬀorts of decentralising spending competencies are noticed against the background
of a secular trend of ﬁscal centralisation that is observed elsewhere. Matsusaka and
McCarty (2001) cast some theoretical and empirical doubt on the presumption that the
initiative always helps to solve agency problems. Following their line of argument, under
conditions of uncertainty about voters’ preferences the threat with an initiative can be
used by interest groups to draw the representative towards their political bliss points.
This argument is, however, valid only for the initiative, where interest groups can act as
agenda setters. If, in contrast, majority approval in an obligatory referendum is necessary
before a policy is executed, while the proposal itself is drafted by the representative, then
the direct-democratic instrument works as a control mechanism. Proposals that are not
beneﬁcial to the median voter cannot be passed and the obligatory referendum binds the
representative to the policy preferences of the median voter. The same tendency holds
for an optional referendum, but the presence of signiﬁcant costs of organising such a
referendum renders an outcome that is further away from the policy the median voter
prefers.
In an empirical companion paper to this study, Feld et al. (2006) report evidence from
the Swiss cantonal and local level, which strongly supports the hypothesis that ﬁscal cen-
tralisation is less pronounced in cantons where the instrument of a ﬁscal referendum is
7available to voters. In the present paper, we oﬀer a formal theoretical interpretation of
these empirical results and argue that it is generally more diﬃcult to centralize decision-
making on public goods when this decision is subject to a popular referendum, vis-a-vis
purely representative democracy. This holds for both cooperative and non-cooperative
decision-making of local representatives on the central level. In the ﬁrst case, the pos-
sibility of rent-extraction by representatives is chieﬂy responsible for the result, while in
the second case, the diﬃculty to institutionally steer direct-democratic decision-making
through interventions such as gerrymandering is the driving force.
3. Assumptions of the model
In this section, a simple model with two regions is introduced where diﬀerent local public
goods are supplied in two jurisdictions and where intrajurisdictional utility-spillovers do
occur. Suppose that, partially resembling the speciﬁcations of Besley and Coate (2000)
as well as Dur and Roelfesma (2005), an individual I in one of the regions i,j ∈ 1,2 with
i 6= j has the utility function
U
I
i = x + λ
I[b(gi) + γb(gj)] (1)
where x is the amount of private goods consumed, g is the quantity of a local public good,
γ ∈ (0,1] is a spillover parameter signifying for instance geographical proximity between
the two regions, and γ∗ will later denote that level of threshold spillovers where for any
γ > γ∗ centralisation is strictly preferred over a decentralised regime. The function
b : R+ → R+ is a strictly concave, increasing valuation function for public goods.
8Furthermore, we assume that the parameter λ which denotes the preferences for public
goods is distributed over an inverval (0, ¯ λ] such that the median preference is identical in
both regions, λm
i = λm
j = 1. We therefore assume that diﬀerent public goods with positive
spatial spillovers are supplied in the two regions, but that the preference intensity of the
median voter for public goods is identical in both regions. This latter assumption serves
primarily to simplify the analysis, but it can also be interpreted as an attempt to make the
conditions for centralisation through popular approval as favourable as possible. If there
was heterogeneity regarding λ amongst the median voters, this would have an negative
eﬀect on the likelihood of centralisation through referendum. Restricting the analysis
to positive spillovers here is warranted in our opinion, since as a real-world problem,
free-riding on the supply of public goods in neighbouring jurisdictions is a by far more
acute problem compared to negative spatial externalities generated by local or regional
consumption of public goods. The analysis could, however, principally be generalised to
include negative spillovers.
We let the public good preferences of candidates for political oﬃce be distributed over
the same interval and also assume that, if a representative is drawn randomly, her ex
ante expected public goods preference is E(λr) = 1. As will become clear in Section 4, it
would generally be beneﬁcial for an oﬃce-seeking candidate to signal that he is of some
type λr 6= 1. However, we assume that there are simply no mechanisms to credibly do so.
With this assumption, we deviate from a substantial part of the earlier literature. For
example, Alesina (1988) shows for a repeated game between two ideologically motivated
candidates that, given that their respective political bliss points are common knowledge,
9there will generally be (imperfect) convergence of the programmes announced and im-
plemented by the candidates. In a diﬀerent framework that does not incorporate post-
electoral mechanisms of commitment to electoral promises, Besley and Coate (1997) ar-
gue that candidates will always implement their own preferred policies when elected, and
their derivation of political equilibria accordingly depends on candidate preferences being
common knowledge.
In contrast, the assumption that the true preferences of a representative are not observ-
able is probably not unrealistic, since we frequently observe in political practice that an-
nounced platforms are tailored strategically to win majorities and are not identical with
the actual preferences of candidates running for oﬃce. Even if political parties exist and
cater to diﬀerent constituencies, it can usually be observed that successful parties cover
a very broad range of heterogeneous positions, so that membership in a particular party
is also not a very clear signal of a candidate’s true type λr. Furthermore, the decision to
centralise competencies normally is relevant for longer periods of time. It is a decision on
an institutional change, and future incumbents who are completely unknown at the time
of decision-making are expected to work within this institutional framework. Therefore,
it is useful to work with the assumption that the decision on centralisation is not made
by taking account of one particular incumbent’s type λr, but by taking account of the
expected types of as yet unknown future incumbents.
Both regions are inhibited by an equal number of n individuals. Also, the technologies
of public goods provision are identical in both regions and public goods are ﬁnanced by
lump sum taxes such that each individual has to give up one unit of the private good in
10order to allow the provision of one unit of a local public good. In other words, regions are
completely identical as far as the technicalities of public good provision are concerned,
with the only qualiﬁcation that diﬀerent kinds of public goods are supplied in the two
regions. For example, region i might supply a publicly funded theatre that can also be
visited by citizens of j, while j supplies a public park that is also visited by citizens of i.
Finally, we assume that a representative who is in oﬃce can secure a rent from every unit
of a local public good that is supplied under his legislation. Thus, while a representative
formally has to pay the same head tax as every other citizen, his eﬀective contribution
is only σgi with σ ∈ [0,1) (i.e., he secures a rent of (1 − σ) per unit of public goods, but
will never be able to free-ride completely with σ = 0). As will become clear later, the
possibility of rent-extraction plays a crucial role for the relative reluctance of citizens to
delegate competencies to the central level.
4. Three regimes of public good provision
For all scenarios that will be discussed in this paper, the assumed utility function yields
single-peaked preferences for the level of the public good that a voter prefers in her home
jurisdiction. There, the political problem is also unidimensional. Candidates are oﬃce-
seeking and motivated by the rent that can be extracted when being in oﬃce. In all local
elections and referenda, the median voter theorem therefore applies in the sense that all
candidates have an incentive to oﬀer a platform that coincides with the commonly known
median voter’s preferences. They can, however, not credibly commit to implement this
platform in post-election politics. With uncertainty regarding the true type λr, in his
11institutional comparison of diﬀerent regimes, the median voter can do no better than to
calculate the representative outcomes with E(λr) = 1.
Regarding the political institutions of public goods provision, three diﬀerent regimes
need to be distinguished: decentralised and centralised provision of public goods, where
the latter can either be non-cooperative, or cooperative with representatives seeking a
consensus on the level of public goods in both regions.
4.1. Decentralised public good provision. In this case, the median voter in each






i − gi (2)
which leads to the ﬁrst order condition of ∂b(gi)/∂gi = 1 for an optimal gDm
i . A repre-






i − σgi (3)
where Ur
i = x+λr[b(gi)+γb(gj)], which leads to the ﬁrst order condition of ∂b(gi)/∂gi =
σ/λr for an optimal gDr
i . A median voter endowed with perfect knowledge would thus
choose a representative with a preference for public goods λr = σ. Without credible
signaling mechanisms for the representatives’ true public goods preferences, however,
the expected true value of λr is E(λr) = 1. In this case, representative democracy
is associated with expected overspending, the actual extent of which will depend on
inﬂuences not formally considered here, such as the likelihood and severity of ex post
punishment via retrospective voting. If, on the other hand, a budget referendum is
obligatory or can be organised at suﬃciently low cost, overspending will be avoided.
12Plainly, direct democracy serves as a substitute for strategic voting in order to enforce
the bliss point of the median voter as the policy that is to be implemented.
4.2. Centralised, cooperative public good provision. To analyse this institutional
framework, we assume, closely related to Weingast (1979), that both elected representa-
tives announce their wishes for the level of public goods in their own jurisdiction and en-
gage in pork-barelling thereafter, i.e. every representative is able to implement her ideal
spending proposal for her own jurisdiction, but has no inﬂuence on the policy chosen for
the other jurisdiction. This does of course not imply that representatives always prefer
centralisation to a decentralised regime, since depending on the values of σ and γ the
resulting overall degree of overspending may deter them from the decision to centralise.
Under all centralised regimes, a simple cost-sharing rule is assumed, which arranges
that the total costs of public good provision are divided equally between both juris-
dictions. This is reasonable, because in a unitary regime, common standards of ﬁscal
non-discrimination require that the tax system is identical for all citizens, regardless of
their geographic location. This, however, immediately implies in our framework that
the lump sum taxes are identical for all taxpayers, so that the ﬁscal burden is uniformly









(gi + gj) (4)
so that the ﬁrst order condition is ∂b(gi)/∂gi = σ/2. From the symmetry assumption,
it follows that gC
j = gC
i . Letting the median voter in each jurisdiction decide about
which public good levels he would prefer under this regime of cost sharing would, on
the other hand, lead to the ﬁrst order conditions ∂b(gi)/∂gi = 1/2 and ∂b(gj)/∂gj =
131/2γ. Measured against the median preferences, a collusive agreement between regional
representatives would therefore always lead to overspending, even if σ = 1, as long as
spillovers are not complete and γ < 1.
4.3. Centralised, non-cooperative public good provision. We let the cost-sharing
rule from the cooperatively centralised regime remain in place. However, the spending
levels under non-cooperative centralisation are not decided upon by collusive agreement
between representatives. Rather, decision-making power is delegated to centralized insti-
tutions of collective decision-making. Suppose further that, on the central level, a deci-
sion is made between a spending proposal drafted in i and a spending proposal drafted
in j. Then, p ∈ (0,1) denotes the probability that a proposal from i is chosen at the
central level, and correspondingly, (1 − p) is the probability of choice for the proposal
from j. The uncertainty about the outcome of the centralized decision will usually have
multiple causes: voter turnout may be diﬀerent across jurisdictions, in a representative
system constituencies may be shaped to inﬂuence the result in a certain direction and so
on.
If a decentralised referendum democracy is the status quo, then in a ﬁrst step the regional
constituencies have to decide which policies they would implement on the central level,
if they were successful. Note that under the very general assumptions made here on
the utility function, a total median in all directions as proposed by Davis, DeGroot and
Hinich (1972) will not generally exist. Nevertheless, the individual preferences remain
single-peaked in the two-dimensional policy space and the individual utility-maximising
quantities of gi and gj preferred by any voter rise strictly monotonously with λ. Therefore,
14for this scenario we introduce the additional assumption that only proposals that reﬂect
the sincere bliss point of at least one voter can be put on the regional ballot. In this case,
the distribution of individual bliss points in the two-dimensional policy space generated
by our individual maximisation problems is suﬃcient to ensure that no proposal can win
a pairwise vote against a proposal that coincides with the median voter’s bliss point. If
a non-cooperative spending proposal is passed by a referendum, the median voter on the











(gi + gj) (5)
with the ﬁrst order conditions being ∂b(gi)/∂gi = 1/2 and ∂b(gj)/∂gj = 1/2γ. If, on












(gi + gj), (6)
yielding as ﬁrst order conditions ∂b(gi)/∂gi = σ/2 and ∂b(gj)/∂gj = σ/2γ.
Non-cooperative centralisation therefore introduces an additional element of uncertainty.
With a probability p, the median voter or representative from i is in the comfortable
situation to implement her ideal spending proposals in both i and in j. With probability
(1 − p), she has to live under a spending proposal drafted in j, which becomes more
unfavourable, the lower the value of the spillover parameter γ is.
155. Pathways to a centralisation of spending competencies
We have seen in the preceding section that from the perspective of the median voter,
a centralised regime is associated with a number of additional risks vis-a-vis a decen-
tralised regime – general overspending in a cooperatively centralised regime, and a pos-
sibly complete loss of political control in a non-cooperatively centralised regime. Repre-
sentatives are confronted with quite similar problems, though. They risk losing politi-
cal power completely under non-cooperative centralisation, and they may face a spend-
ing proposal from the other jurisdiction under cooperative centralisation that, from their
own perspective, implies extreme overspending, particularly if spillovers are low.
Thus, there is no a priori reason to believe that centralisation via referendum is more
or less easy to achieve compared to centralisation by consenting representatives. In this
section, we will explore these diﬀerent pathways to a centralised regime in detail. It will
be shown that (i) if spillovers are suﬃciently high and rent-extraction by representatives
is suﬃciently low, then citizens and representatives are indeed willing to take the risks
of centralisation and that (ii) for all pathways to centralisation there are simple and
reasonable conditions under which the median voter is relatively reluctant to centralise
compared to her representative.
5.1. Centralization via referendum. Presuming that the status quo is a decen-
tralised setting and that we are interested in processes of centralisation, the crucial
question is to see under which conditions the electorate or representatives are inclined to
agree to a centralisation of public spending. Comparing the median voter’s utility under
16a decentralised, direct-democratic regime with that under a cooperatively centralised
regime, it is easy to see that centralisation will be preferred if
b(g
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note
Lemma 1. If σ is suﬃciently large to ensure that the left hand side of (8) is not smaller
than 1/2, then there exists always a γ∗
1 ≤ 1 so that
b(gC









and the median voter prefers cooperatively centralised over direct-democratic decen-
tralised provision of public goods.
Proof. Eq. (8) follows immediately from (7). From our ﬁrst order conditions, it follows
that the slope of b(·) at gDm
i equals unity, while it equals σ/2 ≤ 1/2, at gC
i . The left hand
side of (8) displays the slope of the secant that runs through gC
i and gDm
i . Therefore,
and due to the concavity of b(·), the value of the left hand side has to be strictly smaller
than unity and larger than σ/2. For very small values of σ, the slope of the secant may
be smaller than the right hand side of (8) even for γ = 1. Thus, centralization will only
be favoured if the rents appropriated by the representatives are suﬃciently small and
the spillovers are suﬃciently large. 
Even with complete spillovers, the median voter will resist centralisation if the degree
of rent-extraction by representatives is suﬃciently large. In the case analysed here, citi-
zens give up means of controlling their representatives when the agree to centralise, and
17they are only willing to do so if the overspending induced by rent-extraction is not too
excessive.
If the decentralised, direct-democratic regime competes against a non-cooperative, cen-
tralised regime with direct-democratic decision-making over the spending proposals, cen-
tralisation will be preferred if
p[b(g
Nm
i ) + γb(g
Nm
j )] + (1 − p)[b(g
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i .
Note that the costs are not state-dependent due to the symmetry assumption; the same
amount will be spent on public goods regardless of which spending proposal is imple-
mented, but it will be diﬀerently allocated across regions. Based upon this inequality, we
can state
Lemma 2. For any p ∈ [0,1], there exists a γ∗
2 ≤ 1 that is suﬃciently large to render a
centralised direct-democratic regime the preferred regime of public goods provision. For
p = 1, centralisation is preferred for any γ ∈ [0,1].
Proof. See the appendix.
Let v(p,γ) denote the expected beneﬁts from centralisation and w(γ) denote the expected
extra costs, as written for p = 1 in the proof of Lemma 2. It is straightforward that with
γ = 1 the outcome is the same regardless which jurisdiction decides on the central level,
so that v(p,1) is independent of p. But if we plot the values of v(p,γ)∀γ ∈ (0,1] in
γ, then we see that this curve rotates to the southeast with declining p and may even
become negative for a combination of low values of p and γ. In other words, and given the
18fact that the value of w is not state-dependent, the interval [γ∗
2,1] where centralisation is
preferred shrinks with a declining p. The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
If the probability of political success on the central level declines, the expected beneﬁts
of centralisation ceteris paribus also decline. If the value of the spillover parameter γ
would rise at the same time (e.g. due to technological innovations increasing the spatial
range of a local public good), this could, however, compensate for the decline of p. The
interests of regions i and j become less divergent, so that it becomes less important
that the spending proposal from the own jurisdiction is eventually implemented by a
non-cooperative centralised regime.
The obvious problem with centralisation decisons is that not both jurisdictions can have
p ≈ 1 at the same time. If it is very likely that the proposal from i succeeds on the
central level, then it has to be very unlikely that the proposal from j succeeds. From
these considerations follows
Lemma 3. The interval [γ∗
2,1] where both median voters simultaneously favour central-
isation is the largest, when p = 1/2.
Proof. It is obvious that the interval of consensual centralisation is the largest, when
both median voters have the same threshold spillover level for favouring centralisation.
Given our symmetry assumptions, this is the case at p = 1/2. 
5.2. Centralisation by consenting representatives. Decision-making on the cen-
tralisation of spending competencies is highly path-dependent. If budgetary decisions in
the local jurisdictions are subject to a popular referendum, it is usually not possible for
19representatives to decide upon the centralisation of spending decisions – the centralisa-
tion decision itself would have to be legitimised via a referendum. Thus, the status quo
for centralisation by consenting representatives are local jurisdictions with representative
decision-making – in other words, we assume that representatives cannot on their own
authority suspend local direct democracy by creating a centralised representative system.
For a representative to favour cooperative centralisation, it is then necessary that
b(g
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Solving this inequality in taking Lemma 1 into account leads to
Proposition 1. For any arbitrarily small level of rent-extraction, i.e. for any σ ∈ [0,1],
cooperative centralisation will be strictly preferred by representatives for a level of
spillovers γ∗
3 < γ∗
1. Contrary to direct democracy, decision-making by representatives
also ensures that even with very high levels of rent extraction, there is a level of spillovers
for which centralisation is preferred.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind this result is that the deviation from her political bliss point with
rising levels of rent-extraction is strictly smaller for a representative, compared to the
median voter. If the possibility to extract rents from the supply of public goods increases,
like the voter the representative is faced with the problem of an oversupply, due to the
fact that the representative from the other jurisdiction is also allowed to implement his
ideal policy. But this problem is attenuated, as the representative’s own ideal policy
increases with a decline of σ, while the reference point of the median voter remains
ﬁxed, independent of σ. With the strict concavity of the valuation function for public
20goods, this eﬀect is reinforced: The higher the level of rent extraction and the preferred
quantities of the public goods, the lower is the utility diﬀerential that the representative
faces in a centralised regime, compared against her ideal point. The cost-sharing rule
under centralisation oﬀers the opportunity to consume larger quantities of the public
goods. This, however, becomes more interesting the more the interests of individuals in
i and j become aligned by increasing spillovers. When a threshold level of spillovers is
reached, centralisation is preferred – and this level is reached earlier for representatives
who, besides the eﬀect already discussed, also beneﬁt from a lower relative price for public
goods.
5.3. Centralisation by non-cooperative representatives. Once again, we assume
institutional path-dependence in the sense that direct-democratic centralisation leads
to a direct-democratic regime on the central level, whereas centralisation conceded by
representatives will install a form of representative democracy on the central level. We
have looked at the former case in Section 5.1 and will look at the latter case now. Let p at
this time denote the probability that a spending proposal drafted by the representative
from i wins in the unitary legitlature, while (1−p) now denotes the probability that the
representative from j prevails. Centralisation is then chosen by the delegate from i (and
symmetrically by her colleague from j) if
p[b(g
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and this calculus leads to
21Lemma 4. For any p ∈ [0,1], there exists a γ∗
4 ≤ 1 that is suﬃciently large to make a
non-cooperatively centralised regime the preferred choice for the representative, compared
to a decentralised regime.
Proof. see the appendix.
There is, however, a twist in this mode of centralisation if we compare it with non-
cooperative centralisation determined by the approval of the two median voters. We
have seen that in cooperative centralisation, the possibility of rent-extraction does play a
crucial role – as soon as rent-extraction occurs, the risk of additional overspending causes
the median voter to be more reluctant than the representative, as the move to install a
cooperatively centralised regime also includes the waiving of referendum control on the
central level. With a non-cooperative regime on the central level, we do not have this
problem. There can be a nation-wide referendum on the central level, and the median
voter expects to be successful there with a certain positive probability. And in addition
to this, the absence of the universalist mode of policy-making on the central level also
reduces the expected overall magnitude of overspending.
From the perspective of the representative, non-cooperative centralisation is also not
more alluring per se than for the median voter, because the ability to extract rents is
not generally beneﬁcial in this scenario. To illustrate this, a look at the diﬀerential
magnitudes of rent-extraction is helpful. Under cooperative centralisation, a glance at
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22due to the fact that the amount of public goods is strictly greater in the cooperative
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With very low spillovers, either gNr
i or gNr
j will assume a very low value, depending on
which representative prevails on the central level, so that overall realised rent-extraction
is lower in the centralised regime. With high levels of spillovers, on the other hand, the
left hand side of the inequality will be strictly greater than the right hand side.
A low value of the parameter σ does therefore not generally render centralisation more
favourable for the representatives if the centralised regime that is to be implemented
makes use of non-cooperative means of collective decision-making. If, for instance, b(g) =
a·gθ with a > 0,θ ∈ (0,1) is chosen as the speciﬁcation for the valuation function, then σ
has no impact at all on the value of γ∗
4. For other speciﬁcations, such as b(g) = ln(1+a·g),
the numerical eﬀect of even very high levels of rent extraction is diminutively small.
Nevertheless, even with σ not playing a role, one can argue that centralisation is more
likely to occur under a representative regime if under direct democratic centralisation
p 6= 1/2. It follows from Lemma 3 that the range of spillovers for which centralisation
is commonly preferred in both jurisdictions will be maximised if p = 1/2. The same
argument holds when representatives decide about non-cooperative centralisation. There
are, though, many reasons that may lead to unequal winning probabilities for the two
spending proposals if we release some of the more stringent assumptions of our model
for a moment. There may be diﬀerences in the culture of political participation, the
costs of getting to the urn may be higher in a more rural compared to a more urban
23jurisdiction and so on. In a direct democracy, where a majority of the entire electorate
decides, it is hardly feasible to shape formal political institutions in order to manipulate
p. Under representative democracy, on the other hand, instruments to manipulate p
are available such as the purposeful shaping of constituencies (Gilligan und Matsusaka,
1999 and 2006). If this is possible, then under representative democracy the range [γ∗,1]
where centralisation is favoured can be extended by ﬁnding formal political institutions
for the central level that ensure that p converges towards 1/2. These considerations
straightforwardly lead to
Proposition 2. Representatives are more inclined to favour centralisation of spending
competencies than voters in direct-democratic decision-making under non-cooperative
central decision-making, since a representative system allows for the adjustment of p via
the choice of appropriate formal institutions in the case that p 6= 1/2 at the outset.
5.4. Direct-democratic veto power. So far, we have restricted ourself to path-
dependent processes of centralisation. However, instruments of direct democracy also
frequently serve to veto decisions that have been made by representatives. With regard
to the argument that centralisation is often nothing else than a collusion of representa-
tives in order to appropriate higher rents (Blankart, 2000), it is therefore of particular
interest to analyse if a referendum can serve as a mechanism to avoid such collusive
activities. Indeed, many countries have constitutional provisions that require popular
approval for substantial revisions of the formal institutional framework.
In order to see under which conditions a collusive (i.e., cooperative) attempt to centralize
spending competencies is approved by the median voter, we need to compare her utility
24under a decentralised representative democracy, which is the status quo, and a coopera-
tively centralised regime, which will be accepted if
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Proposition 3. For any σ ≤ ˆ σ where ˆ σ 6< 1/2 the median voter will never approve of
cooperative centralisation by representatives, regardless of the value of γ. For σ > ˆ σ,
cooperative centralisation is approved if γ is suﬃciently large.




j , the condition
for approval simpliﬁes to
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Due to the ﬁrst order conditions from Section 3 and the strict concavity of b(·), the
value of the left hand side cannot rise above σ or fall below σ/2. From this, it follows
immediately that even for γ = 1, the inequality cannot hold if σ < 1/2. Since the actual
value will, depending on the slope of b(·), lie within in the interval (σ/2,σ), we have
ˆ σ > 1/2. If σ > ˆ σ, the inequality will hold for suﬃciently high spillover levels. 
Again, the fact that high spillover levels align the interests of both median voters can at-
tenuate the risk of overspending that is associated with the universalist mode of decision-
making on the central level, and lead the median voter to approve of cooperative centrali-
sation. However, if the magnitude of rent-extraction is too large, then the spillover eﬀect
does not suﬃce to warrant centralisation from the viewpoint of the voter. She avoids
collusive overspending by vetoing the centralisation process in a referendum.
256. Discussion and Conclusions
The main result of the paper is that in a political environment with uncertainty regard-
ing the true preferences of candidates for political oﬃce, where strategic delegation is
not feasible, the mere existence of rents that can be extracted from holding political of-
ﬁce suﬃces to make centralisation more unlikely in a direct-democratic framework com-
pared to a representative democracy, if decision-making on the central level is made co-
operatively. Furthermore, direct democracy does indeed serve as veto instrument for the
voter vis-a-vis the representative. If, on the other hand, central decision-making is non-
cooperative and the decisive voter is for some reason more likely to come from one region
than from the other, then under a one-man-one-vote principle only a representative sys-
tem allows (for example through gerrymandering) to move p on the central level closer
to 1/2 and thereby increase the willingness to centralise.
It is useful to emphasize again at this point that the theoretical perspective taken in this
paper has a deliberate focus on the imperfections of democratic decision-making. Voters
do suﬀer from uncertainty when they attempt to delegate decision-making competencies
to representatives, and the ignorance regarding the true preferences of candidates does
impede them from using the instrument of strategic delegation in our model. Since even
political parties usually host a broad continuum of diﬀerent types of candidates, we hold
this to be an empirically reasonable assumption. Certainly, if voters observe an elected
representative and her decisions, they will be able to form more informed beliefs about
this speciﬁc representative. However, this possibility is deliberately not in the focus of
this paper. We are not interested in voters’ learning about speciﬁc candidates in time,
26but rather in forward-looking and, most importantly, institutional decisions. We are
interested in decisions concerning institutional change that are made without knowing
which particular candidates will ultimately act within the future institutional framework.
To model this perspective, it appears to be reasonable to abstract from the short-termed
forming of beliefs about particular politicians.
Concerning the results of the paper, there are also some more general implications
beyond the propositions given above. Most importantly, the general implication is
that cooperative centralisation is more alluring to representatives than non-cooperative
centralisation if their aim is to appropriate rents in the political process. If they have
a choice, and if they do not believe that their own probability of prevailing in non-
cooperative centralisation is overwhelmingly large, they will attempt to ﬁnd a mode of
cooperative policy-making on the central level.
Another implication is that if they are not controlled by means of direct-democratic
intervention, then a higher level of rent extraction (a lower value of σ) is associated
with a more forceful incentive for representatives to cooperatively centralise. The worse
the instruments of controlling representatives already are, the more they are inclined to
induce additional overspending through centralisation, which allows them to appropriate
additional rents. This may hint at an explanation for the emergence of centralisation
processes in historical time. If – for whatever reason – the institutions of decentralised
economies become more sclerotic, allowing for more rents to be extracted, then eventually
a threshold level for σ may be reached which then triggers attempts to centralise political
competencies.
27Of course, the model leaves several aspects of real-life decision-making out of consider-
ation. For example, the representatives’ tendency to centralise may be mitigated by in-
ﬂuences not formally considered here, such as the threat of punishment through retro-
spective voting. But since it is well known that direct democracy leads to tighter control
of politicians compared to representative democracy, such mitigating inﬂuences do not
principally threaten our result: Representative democracy often enough oﬀers the neces-
sary niches to centralise against the will of the median voter, e.g. by centralising at the
beginning of a term and hoping for prospective or myopic voting in the next elections, or
by accompanying an unpopular centralising decision with a popular decision elsewhere.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. In a ﬁrst step, we will show that for p = 1, centralisation is preferred
for any level of spillovers. If γ = 1, the ﬁrst order conditions from Section 2 always lead
to gNm
i = gNm
j . The symmetry assumption ensures that gDm
i = gDm
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which is always true, since with ∂b(gi)/∂gi = 1/2 at gi = gNm
i , with gDm
i < gNm
i and with
the strict concavity of b(·), the left hand side of (12) necessarily assumes a higher value
than 1/2. If γ = 0, (9) collapses to
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with z > 1 (18)
For any z ∈ (1,∞], (17) never assumes a value higher than 1/2. Inequality (16) is always
true so that for γ = 0, centralisation will always be preferred if p = 1. Concerning
other values of γ, there is a complication as far as the beneﬁts of centralisation are not
necessarily rising monotonously with γ. Let
v(p = 1,γ) = b(g
Nm
i ) − b(g
Dm
i ) + γ[b(g
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j ) − b(g
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j )] (19)
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Because the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two terms will be negative for small γ and
because, as can be inferred from the ﬁrst order conditions and using the implicit function
theorem, gNm
j (γ) is either strictly convex with a relatively ﬂat slope for small values of
γ, or linear, v may be declining in an interval (0, ¯ γ] and rises monotonously thereafter.
29With v(p,γ) being strictly convex, w(γ) rising strictly monotonously and v(1,1) > w(1),
it is a necessary condition for v(1,γ) < w(γ) at some γ ∈ [0,1) that v(1, ˆ γ) < w(ˆ γ) with
ˆ γ being exactly that value of γ, where the slopes of w and v are identical. Equating both
partial derivatives yields the condition that b(gNm
j ) = b(gDm
j ), which is the case exactly
at ˆ γ = 1/2. Equating v(1, ˆ γ) and w(ˆ γ) and keeping in mind that in this case, gNm
j = gDm
i,j ,
we ﬁnd that v(1, ˆ γ) > w(ˆ γ) if
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which is always the case, since once again the left hand side is the slope of the secant
and can, due to our ﬁrst order conditions, not be smaller than 1/2. Therefore, for p = 1,
centralisation is preferred irrespective of the degree of spillovers.
The next step is to show that even for p = 0, it is possible that centralisation is preferred.
For this purpose, it is suﬃcient to look at (9), where it is obvious that with γ = 1, the
left hand side of the inequality assumes the same value for any p ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, the
argument that has been made for p = 1,γ = 1 is also valid for p ∈ [0,1],γ = 1. 
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Let α(σ) denote the slope of the secant between gC
i and gDm
i in the direct democracy case
(i.e., the left hand side of (8)), and β(σ) denote the slope of the secant between gC
i and
gDr
i in the case of representative democracy. Then, under direct democracy, centralisation
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warrants centralisation. With σ = 1, the ﬁrst order conditions for the public goods levels
are identical and so are the threshold spillover levels, γ∗
3 = γ∗
1. For the threshold spillover









⇒ β(σ) > σα(σ). (29)
From the concavity of b(·) and the ﬁrst-order-conditions derived in Section 3, it follows
that both α(σ) and β(σ) are concave on σ ∈ [0,1]. The right hand side of (29), however,
is strictly convex due to the multiplication of α(σ) and σ. Assuming σ = 1, we get
α(1) = β(1) due to the completely similar incentive structure for voter and representative,
which implies gDm
i = gDr
i . Suppose, on the other hand, that σ → 0. This implies
extremely high public good supplies gC → ∞ and, again due to the strict concavity of
b(·), α(σ),β(σ) → 0, which trivially also implies σα(σ) → 0. From this, it necessarily
follows that there is no value σ ∈ [0,1] for which (29) does not hold.
The second part of Proposition 1 is straightforward and follows from (25). The left hand
side is strictly greater than σ/2, while the right hand side converges from above to σ/2
if γ → 1. Therefore, there has to exist some, possibly high, spillover level for which
equation (25) holds. 
31Proof of Lemma 4. The proof of Lemma 4 is largely analogous to the proof of Lemma
2 given above. We will therefore give this proof in a more abbreviated form. Again, we











which is always true due to the ﬁrst order conditions derived in Section 3 and the strict
concavity of b(·).














with z > 1. (31)
The right hand side never assumes a value larger than σ/2, so that, again, the inequality
always holds. Thus, centralisation will always be preferred for extreme values of the
spillover parameter with p = 1. For γ ∈ (0,1) the same complication may generally occur
as in the direct-democratic case, which leads us to again write the expected beneﬁts and
costs of centralisation seperably. This leads us to
v(p = 1,γ) = b(g
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Looking for that ˆ γ where the slope of v and w are identical, we ﬁnd by equating (34) and
(35) that this is the case for b(gNr
j ) = b(gDr
j ) and from the ﬁrst order conditions, we ﬁnd
that this condition holds for a unique σ/2γ = σ ⇒ ˆ γ = 1/2. Keeping in mind that for ˆ γ,
32gNr
j = gDr
j , we can infer if
v(p = 1, ˆ γ) > w(ˆ γ) (36)
holds and ﬁnd out that this inequality holds, if and only if
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which again is always the case due to the values of the ﬁrst order conditions derived in
Section 3. Therefore, for p = 1 we have v > w for any admissable value of γ. A glance
at (11) shows that for γ = 1, (11) analogously to (9) assumes the same value for any
p ∈ [0,1], so that the argument that has been made for p = 1,γ = 1 is again also valid
for p ∈ [0,1],γ = 1. 
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